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public funds to encourage its own values, 
such as favoring childbirth over abortion. 
The Court said that the Connecticut 
regulation: 
" ... places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's 
path to an abortion. An indigent 
woman who desires an abortion 
sufferes no disadvantage as a conse-
quence of Connecticut's decision to 
fund childbirth; she continues as before 
to be dependent on private sources 
. . .. The State may have made 
childbirth a more attractice alternative, 
thereby influencing the woman's deci-
sion, but it has imposed no restriction 
on access to abortions that was not 
already there." 97 S.Ct. 2382-2383. 
Connecticut's regulation can be sus-
tained under the "rational basis" test that 
applies in the absence of a suspect 
classification or the interference with a 
fundamental right; i.e. whether the legis-
lative scheme rationally furthers some 
legitimate, articulated purpose. 
The Court concluded that the Connec-
ticut regulation meets the requirement 
that the distinction between childbirth 
and non therapeutic abortion is rationally 
related to a constitutionally permissable 
state purpose. That according to the 
Court, is the protection of the potential 
life of the fetus by encouraging normal 
childbirth. 
The Court cited Roe v. Wade as recog-
nizing the state's strong interest existing 
throughout the pregnancy, including the 
first trimester. The subsidy of costs rel-
ated to childbirth, which are greater than 
the costs of a first trimester abortion, is a 
rational means of furthering the state's in-
terest. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471, 475 (1970), the court held that 
classifications survive equal protection 
challenges when a "reasonable basis" for 
the classification is shown, despite a 
recognition that laws and regulations 
allocating welfare funds involve "the most 
basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings .... " 
Marshall's dissent in Beal actually is a 
challenge to the Court's holding in Maher. 
Marshall calls for a new equal protection 
analysis, which would weigh three factors: 
the importance of the governmental 
benefits denied, the character of the class, 
and the asserted state interests. 
The Court in Maher, however, refuses 
to engage in a weighing and balancing of 
benefits, class characteristics and strength 
of state interests. Rather, the Court stated 
that "[wlhen an issue involves policy 
choices as sensitive as those implicated by 
public funding of non therapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for their 
resolution in a democracy is the legis-





by Charles F. Chester 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977), the 
Supreme Court decided by a vote of 7-2 
that it was necessary to prevent a presi-
dent from concealing information of in-
terest to the public simply because the in-
formation would reveal embarrassing yet 
truthful facts about him. By sustaining the 
constitutionality of the Presidential 
Recording and Materials Preservation Act 
(PRMPA) 44 U.s.C. §2107, the Court has 
taken a positive step in the direction of 
curbing the abuse of presidential power. 
The PRMPA was the congressional 
reaction to an agreement between a 
former president, Richard M. Nixon and a 
former General Services Administrator, 
Arthur F. Sampson. They agreed that 
General Services Administration would 
possess the infamous "Nixon Tapes", but 
that Nixon would retain all property rights 
to them. One of these rights was to have 
the tapes detroyed at Nixon's will, upon 
his death, or by September 1, 1984. 
Congress, disturbed by this prospective 
and arbitrary power reserved for Nixon, 
passed legislation to control custody of 42 
million pages of documents and 880 reels 
of tape. The PRMPA provides for a 
screening process by which materials of a 
personal nature would be returned to Nix-
on and those of' historical significance 
would be released to the public. The 
destruction of a President's materials is 
prohibited and specific items necessary 
for judicial proceedings are subject to su-
poena. 
Although a president still had the right 
of access to his materials, Nixon wished to 
retain full control over his presidential 
materials. 
Nixon sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief and enforcement of his agree-
ment with the GSA in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia. The district 
court dismissed his case and the decision 
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia. 
In response to Nixon's claim that he 
was being unlawfully deprived of con-
stitutionally delegated executive powers, 
the Supreme Court decided that Congress 
did have the authority to pass legislation 
affecting the disposition of presidential 
materials. The opinion acknowledged that 
Nixon retained the full executive control 
to which he was entitled because the 
release of any tapes is subject to "any 
legally or constitutionally based right of 
privilege." In the Court's opinion Con-
gress was not attempting to gain any new 
authority or take away any legitimate 
presidential powers. The legislative intent 
of the PRMPA was held to be the protec-
tion of the public's right to know the truth 
about Watergate and the restoration of 
public confidence in government. 
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Once again the Court refused to recog-
nize an absolute and unqualified executive 
privilege in a president. To allow such a 
privilege would have permitted Nixon to 
withhold tapes from judicial officers 
which would roadblock the legal proceed-
ings connected with Watergate. 
The opinion distinguished legitimate 
constitutional privileges relating to mili-
tary, diplomatic, and national security 
from mere political expedience. The 
Court found that most of the presidential 
materials related more to a public interest 
in Watergate than to national security or 
diplomacy. The Court's disbelief in Nix-
on's claim for executive privilege cover-
ing all the materials was bolstered by his 
demonstrated lack of personal familarity 
with all but a few of his presidential 
materials. 
Since the bulk of the recordings and 
papers related to executive activities in 
which the public had an interest, the 
Court found that the tapes were not solely 
of a personal nature and therefore could 
not remain under Nixon's exclusive con-
trol. The Court agreed that had the former 
president's materials been of such a type, 
unrelated to Nixon's public activities, 
their removal from public scrutiny would 
be justified. 
Conceding that Nixon's privacy 
deserved some legal protection, the Court 
believed the PRMPA provided adequate 
safeguards. Under the Presidential 
Recordings Act, the materials of former 
presidents are subjected to screening pro-
cedures by government archivists. After 
screening, purely private information is to 
be returned to the chief executive and 
cannot be publicly disseminated. Even 
Nixon's brief acknowledged how limited 
the privacy interest of a public official 
would be in citing New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which 
holds that any individual entering public 
life voluntarily surrenders some rights of 
privacy. 
With a touch of irony, Nixon, who ad-
vanced his early political career by de-
nouncing the Communist Party, relied 
upon cases brought by members of the 
Party in his own Fourth Amendment argu-
ment. These cases were brought in 
response to unreasonable government 
searches of Communist Party members 
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homes for extra evidence, unrelated to the 
offenses with which they were charged. 
The Court was not persuaded by the 
argument that the net effect of the 
PRMPA amounted to an unreasonable 
search and seizure of Nixon's property. 
UnCier the Act, the scope of the archivists' 
search and investigation must be 
restricted. Nixon had stated an alternative 
of screening a president's materials via 
judicial review, but the court stated that 
this would subject him to greater public 
scrutiny. 
Nixon's claim that the PRMPA violated 
his First Amendment rights was also re-
jected. He claimed the Act restricted his 
freedom to participate freely in political 
activity, would hamper his ability to 
speak freely, and would prohibit him from 
taking inconsistent positions. The Court 
expressed confidence in the screening 
process of the PRMPA and, in his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Powell observed that 
the original District Court decision 
recommended actual involvement by Nix-
on in that process. 
Finally, Nixon urged the Act violated 
the Bill of Attainder Clause. He equated 
the legislation with the rendering of a 
guilty verdict and with subsequent 
punishment without the benefit of a trial. 
The Court admitted that Title I of the Act 
was created specifically to control Nixon's 
materials, but, the Court was quick to add 
that Title II dealt with recommendations 
for future presidential materials. Title I 
was not considered punishment in the tra-
ditional sense, since Nixon could still 
have access to his materials. After review-
ing the Congressional committee reports, 
the Court concluded that the legislative 
intent was merely to negate the Nixon-
Sampson agreement and not to punish 
Nixon. 
Undaunted by this legal setback, Nixon 
will have yet another case argued before 
the Court this term. The issue will be 
whether his presidential tapes, especially 
those involving the Watergate coverup, 




Flying In The 
Face Of Press 
Privilege 
by Andrew S. Katz 
Carnival entertainer Hugo Zacchini 
found that even a man who earns his liv-
ing by being shot from a cannon can have 
redress of his legal grievances in the na-
tion's highest court. The United States 
Supreme Court, by narrowing the scope 
of news media privilege provided by the 
First Amendment, gave the "human can-
nonball" a second chance to seek 
damages for a tortious appropriation of 
his performance in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S.C!. 2849 
(1977). 
Zacchini's appearance as petitioner in 
the case arose from an incident occuring 
in August, 1972. He was then engaged to 
perform his "human cannonball" act on a 
regular basis at the Geagua County fair in 
Burton, Ohio. A freelance reporter for a 
local television station filmed the IS-sec-
ond act, which involved Zacchini being 
fired from a cannon into a net some 200 
feet away. Prior to the performance the 
reporter was warned by Zacchini not to 
make the film. The film clip was shown 
that evening on the 11 0' clock news, ac-
companied by favorable commentary. 
The performer subsequently brought an 
action in state court for damages against 
the station's operator, Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Company. His complaint 
alleged that the carnival act was "in-
vented by his father and . . . performed 
only by his family for the last fifty years 
. .. ," that the Broadcasting Company 
"showed and commercialized the film of 
his act without his consent ... ," and that 
this conduct was an "unlawful appropria-
tion of plaintiff's profeSSional property." 
97 S.C!. at 2851. The defendant's motion 
